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Abstract
We study a security problem for interconnected systems, where each subsystem aims to detect local attacks using
local measurements and information exchanged with neighboring subsystems. The subsystems also wish to maintain
the privacy of their states and, therefore, use privacy mechanisms that share limited or noisy information with other
subsystems. We quantify the privacy level based on the estimation error of a subsystem’s state and propose a novel
framework to compare different mechanisms based on their privacy guarantees. We develop a local attack detection
scheme without assuming the knowledge of the global dynamics, which uses local and shared information to detect attacks
with provable guarantees. Additionally, we quantify a trade-off between security and privacy of the local subsystems.
Interestingly, we show that, for some instances of the attack, the subsystems can achieve a better detection performance
by being more private. We provide an explanation for this counter-intuitive behavior and illustrate our results through
numerical examples.
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1. Introduction
Dynamical systems are becoming increasingly more dis-
tributed, diverse, complex, and integrated with cyber com-
ponents. Usually, these systems are composed of multiple
subsystems, which are interconnected among each other
via physical, cyber and other types of couplings [1]. An
example of such system is the smart city, which consists
of subsystems such as the power grid, the transportation
network, the water distribution network, and others. Al-
though these subsystems are interconnected, it is usually
difficult to directly measure the couplings and dependen-
cies between them [1]. As a result, they are often operated
independently without the knowledge of the other subsys-
tems’ models and dynamics.
Modern dynamical systems are also increasingly more
vulnerable to cyber/physical attacks that can degrade their
performance or may even render them inoperable [2]. There
have been many recent studies on analyzing the effect of
different types of attacks on dynamical systems and possi-
ble remedial strategies (see [3] and the references therein).
A key component of these strategies is detection of at-
tacks using the measurements generated by the system.
Due to the autonomous nature of the subsystems, each
subsystem is primarily concerned with detection of local
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attacks which affect its operation directly. However, local
attack detection capability of each subsystem is limited
due to the absence of knowledge of the dynamics and cou-
plings with external subsystems. One way to mutually
improve the detection performance is to share information
and measurements among the subsystems. However, these
measurements may contain some confidential information
about the subsystem and, typically, subsystem operators
may be willing to share only limited information due to pri-
vacy concerns. In this paper, we propose a privacy mech-
anism that limits the shared information and characterize
its privacy guarantees. Further, we develop a local at-
tack detection strategy using the local measurements and
the limited shared measurements from other subsystems.
We also characterize the trade-off between the detection
performance and the amount/quality of shared measure-
ments, which reveals a counter-intuitive behavior of the
involved chi-squared (χ2) detection scheme.
Related Work: Centralized attack detection and estima-
tion schemes in dynamical systems have been studied in
both deterministic [4, 5, 6] and stochastic [7, 8] settings.
Recently, there has also been studies on distributed attack
detection including information exchange among the com-
ponents of a dynamical system. Distributed strategies for
attacks in power systems are presented in [9, 10, 11]. In
[5, 12], centralized and decentralized monitor design was
presented for deterministic attack detection and identifica-
tion. In [13, 14], distributed strategies for joint attacks de-
tection and state estimation are presented. Residual based
tests [15] and unknown-input observer-based approaches
Preprint submitted to Elsevier June 25, 2020
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[16] have also been proposed for attack detection. A com-
parison between centralized and decentralized attack de-
tection schemes was presented in [17].The local detectors
in [17] use only local measurements, whereas we allow the
local detectors to use measurements from other subsystems
as well.
Distributed fault detection techniques requiring infor-
mation sharing among the subsystems have also been widely
studied. In [18, 19, 20, 21, 22], fault detection for non-
linear interconnected systems is presented. These works
typically use observers to estimate the state/output, com-
pute the residuals and compare them with appropriate
thresholds to detect faults. For linear systems, distributed
fault detection is studied using consensus-based techniques
in [23, 24] and unknown-input observer-based techniques
in [25].
There have also been recent studies related to privacy
in dynamical systems. Differential privacy based mecha-
nisms in the context of consensus, filtering and distributed
optimization have been proposed (see [26] and the refer-
ences therein). These works develop additive noise-based
privacy mechanisms, and characterize the trade-offs be-
tween the privacy level and the control performance. Other
privacy measures based on information theoretic metrics
like conditional entropy [27], mutual information [28, 29]
and Fisher information [30] have also been proposed. In
[31], a privacy vs. cooperation trade-off for multi-agent
systems was presented. In [32], a privacy mechanism for
consensus was presented, where privacy is measured in
terms of estimation error covariance of the initial state.
The authors in [33] showed that the privacy mechanism
can be used by an attacker to execute stealthy attacks in
a centralized setting.
In contrast to these works, we identify a novel and
counter-intuitive trade-off between security and privacy in
interconnected dynamical systems. In a preliminary ver-
sion of this work [34], we compared the detection perfor-
mance between the cases when the subsystems share full
measurements (no privacy mechanism) and when they do
not share any measurements. In this paper, we introduce
a privacy framework and present an analytic characteriza-
tion of privacy-performance trade-offs.
Contributions: The main contributions of this paper are
as follows. First, we propose a privacy mechanism to keep
the states of a subsystem private from other subsystems in
an interconnected system. The mechanism limits both the
amount and quality of shared measurements by projecting
them onto an appropriate subspace and adding suitable
noise to the measurements. This is in contrast to prior
works which use only additive noise for privacy. We de-
fine a privacy ordering and use it to quantify and compare
the privacy of different mechanisms. Second, we propose
and characterize the performance of a chi-squared (χ2) at-
tack detection scheme to detect local attacks in absence of
the knowledge of the global system model. The detection
scheme uses local and received measurements from neigh-
boring subsystems. Third, we characterize the trade-off
between the privacy level and the local detection perfor-
mance in both qualitative and quantitative ways. Interest-
ingly, our analysis shows that in some cases both privacy
and detection performance can be improved by sharing
less information. This reveals a counter-intuitive behavior
of the widely used χ2 test for attack detection [7, 8, 35],
which we illustrate and explain.
Mathematical notation: Tr(·), Im(·), Null(·) and
Rank(·) denote the trace, image, null space, and rank of
a matrix, respectively. (·)T and (·)+ denote the trans-
pose and Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of a matrix. A
positive (semi)definite matrix A is denoted by A > 0
(A ≥ 0). diag(A1, A2, · · · , An) denotes a block diagonal
matrix whose block diagonal elements are A1, A2, · · · , An.
The identity matrix is denoted by I (or In to denote its
dimension explicitly). A scalar λ ∈ C is called a gen-
eralized eigenvalue of (A,B) if (A − λB) is singular. ⊗
denotes the Kronecker product. A zero mean Gaussian
random variable y is denoted by y ∼ N (0,Σy), where Σy
denotes the covariance of y. The (central) chi-square dis-
tribution with q degrees of freedom is denoted by χ2q and
the noncentral chi-square distribution with noncentrality
parameter λ is denoted by χ2q(λ). For x ≥ 0, let Qq(x) and
Qq(x;λ) denote the right tail probabilities of a chi-square
and noncentral chi-square distributions, respectively.
2. Problem Formulation
We consider an interconnected discrete-time LTI dy-
namical system composed of N subsystems. Let S ,
{1, 2, · · · , N} denote the set of all subsystems and let S−i ,
S \ {i}, where \ denotes the exclusion operator. The dy-
namics of the subsystems are given by:
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +Bix−i(k) + wi(k), (1)
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k) i ∈ S, (2)
where xi ∈ Rni and yi ∈ Rpi are the state and out-
put/measurements of subsystem i, respectively. Let n ,∑N
i=1 ni. Subsystem i is coupled with other subsystems
through the interconnection term Bix−i(k), where x−i ,
[xT1 , · · · , xTi−1, xTi+1, · · · , xTN ]T ∈ Rn−ni denotes the states
of all other subsystems. We refer to x−i as the intercon-
nection signal. Further, wi ∈ Rni and vi ∈ Rpi are the pro-
cess and measurement noise, respectively. We assume that
wi(k) ∼ N (0,Σwi) and vi(k) ∼ N (0,Σvi) for all k ≥ 0,
with Σwi > 0 and Σvi > 0. The process and measurement
noise are assumed to be white and independent for differ-
ent subsystems. Finally, we assume that the initial state
xi(0) ∼ N (0,Σxi(0)) is independent of wi(k) and vi(k) for
all k ≥ 0. We make the following assumption regarding
the interconnected system:
Assumption 1: Subsystem i has perfect knowledge of its
dynamics, i.e., it knows (Ai, Bi, Ci), the statistical proper-
ties of wi, vi and xi(0). However, it does not have knowl-
edge of the dynamics, states, and the statistical properties
of the noise of the other subsystems. 
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Figure 1: An interconnected system consisting of N = 4 subsystems.
The solid lines represent state coupling among the subsystems. For
attack detection by Subsystem 1, its neighboring agents 2 and 3 com-
municate their output information to 1 (denoted by dashed lines).
The attack monitor associated with Subsystem 1 uses the received
information and the local measurements to detect attacks.
Remark 1. (Control input) The dynamics in (1) typ-
ically includes a control input. However, since each sub-
system has the knowledge of its control input, its effect
can be easily included in the attack detection procedure.
Therefore, for the ease of presentation, we omit the con-
trol input. 
We consider the scenario where each subsystem can be
under an attack. We model the attacks as external linear
additive inputs to the subsystems. The dynamics of the
subsystems under attack are given by
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k)+Bix−i(k)+Bai a˜i(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
, ai(k)
+wi(k), (3)
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k) i ∈ S, (4)
where a˜i ∈ Rri is the local attack input for Subsystem i,
which is assumed to be a deterministic but unknown signal
for all i ∈ S. The matrix Bai dictates how the attack a˜i
affects the state of Subsystem i, which we assume to be
unknown to Subsystem i.
Each subsystem is equipped with an attack monitor
whose goal is to detect the local attack using the local mea-
surements. Since Subsystem i does not know Bai , it can
only detect ai = B
a
i a˜i. The detection procedure requires
the knowledge of the statistical properties of yi which de-
pend on the interconnection signal x−i. Since the sub-
systems do not have knowledge of the interconnection sig-
nals (c.f. Assumption 1 ), they share their measurements
among each other to aid the local detection of attacks (see
Fig. 1). The details of how these shared measurements
are used for attack detection are presented in Section 3.
While the shared measurements help in detecting lo-
cal attacks, they can reveal sensitive information of the
subsystems. For instance, some of the states/outputs of a
subsystem may be confidential, which it may not be willing
to share with other subsystems. To protect the privacy of
such states/outputs, we propose a privacy mechanismMi
through which a subsystem limits the amount and quality
of its shared measurements. Thus, instead of sharing the
complete measurements in (4), Subsystem i shares limited
measurements (denoted as y˜i) given by:
Mi : y˜i(k) = Siyi(k) + r˜i(k)
= SiCixi(k) + Sivi(k) + r˜i(k), (5)
where Si ∈ Rmi×pi is a selection matrix suitably chosen to
select a subspace of the outputs, and r˜i(k) ∼ N (0,Σr˜i) is
an artificial white noise (independent of wi and vi) added
to introduce additional inaccuracy in the shared measure-
ments. Without loss of generality, we assume Si to be
full row rank for all i ∈ S. Thus, a subsystem can limit
its shared measurement via a combination of the follow-
ing two mechanisms (i) by sharing fewer (or a subspace
of) measurements, and (ii) by sharing more noisy mea-
surements. Intuitively, when Subsystem i limits its shared
measurements, the estimates of its states/outputs com-
puted by the other subsystems become more inaccurate.
This prevents other subsystems from accurately determin-
ing the confidential states/outputs of Subsystem i, thereby
protecting its privacy. We will explain this phenomenon
in detail in the next section.
Let the parameters corresponding to the limited mea-
surements of subsystem i be denoted by Ii ,
{Ci, Si,Σvi ,Σr˜i}. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 : Each subsystem i ∈ S shares its limited
measurements y˜i in (5) and the parameters Ii with all
subsystems j ∈ S−i.1 
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the goal of each subsys-
tem i is to detect the local attack ai using its local mea-
surements yi and the limited measurements {y˜j}j∈S−i re-
ceived from the other subsystems (see Fig. 1). Further,
we are interested in characterizing the trade-off between
the privacy level and the detection performance.
3. Local attack detection
In this section, we present the local attack detection
procedure of the subsystems and characterize their detec-
tion performance. For the ease or presentation, we de-
scribe the analysis for Subsystem 1 and remark that the
procedure is analogous for the other subsystems.
3.1. Measurement collection
We employ a batch detection scheme in which each
subsystem collects the measurements for k = 1, 2, · · · , T ,
1To be precise, this information sharing is required only between
neighboring subsystems, i.e., between subsystems that are directly
coupled with each other in (1).
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with T > 0, and performs detection based on the collective
measurements. In this subsection, we model the collected
local and shared measurements for Subsystem 1.
Local measurements: Let the time-aggregated local mea-
surements, interconnection signals, attacks, process noise
and measurement noise corresponding to Subsystem 1 be
respectively denoted by
yL , [yT1 (1), yT1 (2), · · · , yT1 (T )]T,
x , [xT−1(0), xT−1(1), · · · , xT−1(T − 1)]T,
a˜ , [a˜T1 (0), a˜T1 (1), · · · , a˜T1 (T − 1)]T,
w , [wT1 (0), wT1 (1), · · · , wT1 (T − 1)]T,
v , [vT1 (1), vT1 (2), · · · , vT1 (T )]T, and let
F (Z) ,

C1Z 0 · · · 0
C1A1Z C1Z · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
C1A
T−1
1 Z C1A
T−2
1 Z · · · C1Z
 (6)
= F (I)(IT ⊗ Z).
By using (3) recursively and (4), the local measure-
ments can be written as
yL = Ox1(0) + Fxx+ Fa˜a˜+ Fww + v, (7)
where Fx = F (B1), Fa˜ = F (B
a
1 ), Fw = F (I), and
O ,
[
(C1A1)
T (C1A
2
1)
T · · · (C1AT1 )T
]T
.
Note that w ∼ N (0,Σw) and v ∼ N (0,Σv) with
Σw = IT ⊗ Σw1 > 0 and Σv = IT ⊗ Σv1 > 0.
Let vL , Ox1(0) + Fww + v denote the effective local
noise in the measurement equation (7). Using the fact
that (x1(0), w, v) are independent, the overall local mea-
surements of the subsystem are given by
yL = Fxx+ Fa˜a˜+ vL, where (8)
vL ∼ N (0,ΣvL), ΣvL = OΣx1(0)OT + FwΣwFTw + Σv > 0.
Shared measurements: Let y˜−1(k) ,
[y˜T2 (k), y˜
T
3 (k), · · · , y˜TN (k)]T denote the limited measurements
received by Subsystem 1 from all the other subsystems
at time k. Further, let v−1(k) and r˜−1(k) denote simi-
lar aggregated vectors of {vj(k)}j∈S−1 and {r˜j(k)}j∈S−1 ,
respectively. Then, from (5) we have
y˜−1(k) = S−1C−1x−1(k) + S−1v−1(k) + r˜−1(k), (9)
where S−1, diag(S2, · · · , SN ), C−1, diag(C2, · · · , CN ),
v−1(k) ∼ N (0,Σv−1), Σv−1 = diag(Σv2 , · · · ,ΣvN ) > 0,
r˜−1(k) ∼ N (0,Σr˜−1), Σr˜−1 = diag(Σr˜2 , · · · ,Σr˜N ) ≥ 0.
Further, let the time-aggregated limited measurements
received by Subsystem 1 be denoted by yR ,
[y˜T−1(0), y˜
T
−1(1), · · · , y˜T−1(T−1)]T, and let vR denote similar
time-aggregated vector of {S−1v−1(k) + r˜−1(k)}k=0,··· ,T−1.
Then, from (9), the overall limited measurements received
by Subsystem 1 read as
yR = Hx+ vR, where (10)
H , IT ⊗ S−1C−1, and vR ∼ N (0,ΣvR)
with ΣvR = IT ⊗ (S−1Σv−1ST−1 + Σr˜−1) > 0.
The goal of Subsystem 1 is to detect the local attack using
the local and received measurements given by (8) and (10),
respectively.
3.2. Measurement processing
Since Subsystem 1 does not have access to the inter-
connection signal x, it uses the received measurements to
obtain an estimate of x. Note that Subsystem 1 is oblivi-
ous to the statistics of the stochastic signal x. Therefore,
it computes an estimate of x assuming that x is a deter-
ministic but unknown quantity.
According to (10), yR ∼ N (Hx,ΣvR), and the Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) estimate of x based on yR is com-
puted by maximizing the log-likelihood function of yR, and
is given by:
xˆ= arg max
z
− 1
2
(yR −Hz)TΣ−1vR (yR −Hz)
(a)
= H˜+HTΣ−1vR yR + (I − H˜+H˜)d, where
H˜ , HTΣ−1vRH ≥ 0,
(11)
d is any real vector of appropriate dimension, and equal-
ity (a) follows from Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. If H˜
(or equivalently H) is not full column rank, then the es-
timate can lie anywhere in Null(H˜) = Null(H) (shifted
by H˜+HTΣ−1vR yR). Thus, the component of x that lies in
Null(H) cannot be estimated and only the component of
x that lies in Im(H˜) = Im(HT) can be estimated. Based
on this discussion, we decompose x as
x = (I − H˜+H˜)x+ H˜+H˜x
= (I − H˜+H˜)x+ H˜+HTΣ−1vRHx
(10)
= (I − H˜+H˜)x+ H˜+HTΣ−1vR (yR − vR). (12)
Substituting x from (12) in (8), we get
yL = Fx(I − H˜+H˜)x+ FxH˜+HTΣ−1vR (yR − vR)
+ Fa˜a˜+ vL. (13)
Next, we process the local measurements in two steps.
First, we subtract the known term FxH˜
+HTΣ−1vR yR. Sec-
ond, we eliminate the component (I−H˜+H˜)x (which can-
not be estimated) by premultiplying (13) with a matrix
MT, where
M = Basis of Null
(
[Fx(I − H˜+H˜)]T
)
,
⇒MTFx(I − H˜+H˜) = 0. (14)
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Since the columns of M are basis vectors, M is full
column rank. The processed measurements are given by
z = MT(yL − FxH˜+HTΣ−1vR yR)
(13),(14)
= MTFa˜a˜+M
T(vL − FxH˜+HTΣ−1vR vR),︸ ︷︷ ︸
, vP
(15)
where vP ∼ N (0,ΣvP ). The random variables vL and vR
are independent because they depend exclusively on the
local and external subsystems’ noise, respectively. Using
this fact
ΣvP = M
T
[
ΣvL + FxH˜
+HTΣ−1vRΣvRΣ
−T
vR H(H˜
+)TFTx
]
M
H˜T=H˜
= MTΣvLM +M
TFxH˜
+FTxM
(a)
> 0, (16)
where (a) follows from the facts that M is full column
rank and ΣvL > 0. The processed measurements z in
(15) depend only on the local attack a˜, and the Gaussian
noise vP whose statistics is known to Subsystem 1 (c.f.
Assumptions 1 and 2 ), i.e. z ∼ N (MTFa˜a˜,ΣvP ). Thus,
Subsystem 1 uses z to perform attack detection. Note that
the attack vectors that belong to Null(MTFa˜) cannot be
detected.
The operation of elimination of the unknown compo-
nent (I − H˜+H˜)x from yL also eliminates a component of
the attack a˜. As a result, this operation increases the space
of undetectable attack vectors from Null(Fa˜) to Null(M
TFa˜).
In some cases, this operation could also result in complete
elimination of attacks as shown in the next result.
Lemma 3.1. Consider equation (3) and the limited mea-
surements in (5), and let S−1, C−1,M be defined in (9)
and (14). If
Im(Ba1 ) ⊆ Im
(
B1
[
I − (S−1C−1)+(S−1C−1)
])
, (17)
then MTFa˜ = 0.
Proof: Since Null(H˜) = Null(H), we have
H˜+H˜ = H+H = IT ⊗ (S−1C−1)+(S−1C−1).
Let Z , (S−1C−1)+(S−1C−1). Then, substituting Fx
from (7) in (14), we get
MTF (I)(IT ⊗B1)[I − IT ⊗ Z] = 0
⇒MTF (I)(IT ⊗B1)[IT ⊗ (I − Z)] = 0
⇒MTF (I)(IT ⊗B1[I − Z]) = 0. (18)
If (17) holds, then there exists a matrix P such that Ba1 =
B1[I − Z]P . Thus, from (7), we have
MTFa˜ = M
TF (I)(IT ⊗B1[I − Z]P )
= MTF (I)(IT ⊗B1[I − Z])(IT ⊗ P ) (18)= 0.
Subsystem 1 Subsystem 2
1 1
2 2
3
a˜1
Figure 2: An interconnected system consisting of two subsystems.
The nodes denote the states of the subsystems and solid edges denote
the couplings and interconnections of Subsystem 1 (self edges are
omitted). The attacked node is shaded in red.
The above result has the following intuitive interpre-
tation: if the attacks lie in the subspace of the intercon-
nections that cannot be estimated, then eliminating these
interconnections also eliminates the attacks. In this case,
the processed measurements do not have any signature of
the attacks, which, therefore, cannot be detected. This
result highlights the limitation of our measurement pro-
cessing procedure. Next, we illustrate the result using an
example.
Example 1. Consider an interconnected subsystem con-
sisting of two subsystems with the following parameters
(see Fig. 2):
A1 =
[
1 0 −1
0 1 −1
1 1 1
]
, B1 =
[
1 0
0 1
0 0
]
, Ba1 =
[
1
0
0
]
,
C1 = I3, C2 = I2 and T = 1. We have Fx = B1 and
Fa˜ = B
a
1 . Consider the following two cases:
Case (i): Subsystem 2 shares its 2nd state, i.e., S2 =
S−1 =
[
0 1
]
. In this case, Subsystem 1 does not get infor-
mation about the interconnection affecting its 1st state and
the elimination of this interconnection also eliminates the
attack. It can be verified that M = [ 0 1 00 0 1 ]
T
and MTBa1 =
0.
Case (ii): Subsystem 2 shares its 1st state, i.e., S2 =
S−1 =
[
1 0
]
. In this case, Subsystem 1 gets information
about the interconnection affecting its 1st state. Thus, its
elimination is not required and this preserves the attack.
It can be verified that M = [ 1 0 00 0 1 ]
T
and MTBa1 6= 0.
3.3. Statistical hypothesis testing
The goal of Subsystem 1 is to determine whether it is
under attack or not using the processed measurements z
in (15). Recall that, since Subsystem 1 does not know Ba1 ,
it can only detect a1 = B
a
1 a˜1. Let a ,
[(Ba1 a˜1(0))
T, · · · , (Ba1 a˜1(T − 1))T]T. Then, from (7), we
have Fa˜a˜ = Faa, where Fa = F (I). Thus, processed mea-
surements are distributed according to z ∼ N (MTFaa,ΣvP ).
We cast the attack detection problem as a binary hypoth-
esis testing problem. Since Subsystem 1 does not know
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the attack a, we consider the following composite (simple
vs. composite) testing problem
H0 : a = 0 (Attack absent) vs
H1 : a 6= 0 (Attack present)
We use the Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) cri-
terion [36] for the above testing problem, which is given
by
f(z|H0)
sup
a
f(z|H1)
H0
≷
H1
τ ′ where, (19)
f(z|H0) = 1√
2pi|ΣvP |
e−
1
2 z
TΣ−1vP z and,
f(z|H1) = 1√
2pi|ΣvP |
e−
1
2 (z−MTFaa)TΣ−1vP (z−M
TFaa),
are the probability density functions of the multivariate
Gaussian distribution of z under hypothesis H0 and H1,
respectively, and τ ′ is a suitable threshold. Using the result
in Lemma A.1 in the Appendix to compute the denomi-
nator in (19) and taking the logarithm, the test (19) can
be equivalently written as
t(z) , zTΣ−1vPM
TFaM˜
+FTaMΣ
−1
vP z
H1
≷
H0
τ, (20)
where M˜ = FTaMΣ
−1
vPM
TFa,
and τ ≥ 0 is the threshold. The above test is a χ2 test
since the test statistics t(z) follows a chi-squared distribu-
tion (see Lemma 3.3). The next result simplifies the test
statistics t(z) and provides an interpretation of the test.
Lemma 3.2. (Simplification of test statistics) Let
Σ−1vP = R
TR denote the Cholesky decomposition of Σ−1vP .
Then,
Σ−1vPM
TFaM˜
+FTaMΣ
−1
vP = R
TUUTR, (21)
where U is a matrix whose columns are the orthonormal
basis vectors of Im(RMTFa).
Proof: Let M1 ,MTFa. Then
M˜+ = (MT1 R
TRM1)
+ = (RM1)
+((RM1)
+)T.
Thus, we have
Σ−1vPM
TFaM˜
+FTaMΣ
−1
vP
= (RTR)M1(RM1)
+((RM1)
+)TMT1 (R
TR)
= RT(RM1)(RM1)
+(RM1)(RM1)
+R
= RT(RM1)(RM1)
+R.
Since RM1(RM1)
+ is the orthogonal projection operator
on Im(RM1), RM1(RM1)
+ = UUT, and the proof is com-
plete.
Using Lemma 3.2, the test (20) can be written as
t(z) = zTRTUUTRz
H1
≷
H0
τ. (22)
Thus, the test compares the energy of the signal UTRz
with a given threshold to detect the attacks. Next, we
derive the distribution of the test statistics under both
hypothesis.
Lemma 3.3. (Distribution of test statistics) The dis-
tribution of test statistics t(z) in (22) is given by
t(z) ∼ χ2q under H0, (23)
t(z) ∼ χ2q(λ , aTΛa) under H1, (24)
where q = Rank(MTFa) and Λ = F
T
aMΣ
−1
vPM
TFa.
Proof: By the definition of U in (21), and recalling Σ−1vP =
RTR with R being non-singular, we have
Rank(UTU) = Rank(U) = Rank(RMTFa) = Rank(M
TFa).
Let z′ = UTRz. Under H0, z ∼ N (0,ΣvP ). Thus,
z′ ∼ N (0, UTRΣvPRTU)
(a)
= N (0, Iq),
where (a) follows from RΣvPR
T = I and UTU = Iq.
Therefore, t(z) = (z′)Tz′ ∼ χ2q.
Let M1 = M
TFa. Under H1, z ∼ N (M1a,ΣvP ). Thus,
z′ ∼ N (UTRM1a, Iq)
⇒ t(z) = (z′)Tz′ ∼ χ2q(aTMT1 RTUUTRM1a).
Using UUT = RM1(RM1)
+ from the proof of Lemma 3.2,
we have
aTMT1 R
TUUTRM1a = a
T(RM1)
T(RM1)(RM1)
+(RM1)a
= aT(RM1)
T(RM1)a = a
TMT1 Σ
−1
vPM1a = λ,
and the proof is complete.
Remark 2. (Interpretation of detection parameters
(q, λ)) The parameter q denotes the number of independent
observations of the attack vector a in the processed mea-
surements (15). The parameter λ can be interpreted as the
signal to noise ratio (SNR) of the processed measurements
in (15), where the signal of interest is the attack. 
Next, we characterize the performance of the test (20).
Let the probability of false alarm and probability of detec-
tion for the test be respectively denoted by
PF = Prob(t(z) > τ |H0) (a)= Qq(τ) and,
PD = Prob(t(z) > τ |H1) (b)= Qq(τ ;λ),
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where (a) and (b) follow from (23) and (24), respectively.
Recall that Qq(x) and Qq(x;λ) denote the right tail prob-
abilities of chi-square and noncentral chi-square distribu-
tions, respectively. Inspired by the Neyman-Pearson test
framework, we select the size (PF ) of the test and de-
termine the threshold τ which provides the desired size.
Then, we use the threshold to perform the test and com-
pute the detection probability. Thus, we have
τ(q, PF ) = Q−1q (PF ), (25)
PD(q, λ, PF ) = Qq(τ(q, PF );λ). (26)
The arguments in τ(q, PF ) and PD(q, λ, PF ) explicitly de-
note the dependence of these quantities on the detection
parameters (q, λ) and the probability of false alarm (PF ).
Note that the detection performance of Subsystem 1 is
characterized by the pair (PF , PD), where a lower value of
PF and a higher value of PD is desirable. Later, in order to
compare the performance of two different tests, we select a
common value of PF for both of them, and then compare
the detection probability PD.
The next result states the dependence of the detection
probability on the detection parameters (q, λ).
Lemma 3.4. (Dependence of detection performance
on detection parameters (q, λ)) For any given false
alarm probability PF , the detection probability PD(q, λ, PF )
is decreasing in q and increasing in λ.
Proof: Since PF is fixed, we omit it in the notation. It is
a standard result that for a fixed q (and τ(q)), the CDF (=
1−Qq(τ(q);λ) = 1− PD(q, λ)) of a noncentral chi-square
random variable is decreasing in λ [37]. Thus, PD(q, λ) is
increasing in λ.
Next, we have [37]
PD(q, λ) = e
−λ/2
∞∑
j=0
(λ/2)j
j!
Qq+2j(τ(q)).
From [38, Corollary 3.1], it follows that Qq+2j(τ(q)) =
Qq+2j(Q−1q (PF )) is decreasing in q for all j > 0. Thus,
PD(q, λ) is decreasing in q.
Figure 3 illustrates the dependence of the detection
probability on the parameters (q, λ). Lemma 3.4 implies
that for a fixed q, a higher SNR (λ) leads to a better detec-
tion performance, which is intuitive. However, for a fixed
λ, an increase in the number of independent observations
(q) results in degradation of the detection performance.
This counter-intuitive behavior is due to the fact that the
GLRT in (19) is not an uniformly most powerful (UMP)
test for all values of the attack a. In fact, a UMP test
does not exist in this case [39]. Thus, the test can perform
better for some particular attack values while it may not
perform as good for other attack values. This suboptimal-
ity is an inherent property of the GLRT in (19). It arises
due to the composite nature of the test and the fact that
the value of the attack vector a is not known to the attack
monitor.
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Figure 3: Dependence of the detection probability PD on the detec-
tion parameters (q, λ) for a fixed PF = 0.05. PD decreases mono-
tonically with q (subfigure (a)), whereas it increases monotonically
with λ (subfigure (b)).
Remark 3. (Composite vs. simple test) If the value
of the attack vector (say a1) is known, we can cast a sim-
ple (simple vs. simple) binary hypothesis testing problem
as H0 : a = 0 vs. H1 : a = a1 and use the standard
Likelihood Ratio Test criterion for detection. In this case
the detection probability depends only on PF and SNR (λ),
and for any given PF , the detection performance improves
as the SNR increases. 
4. Privacy quantification
In this section, we quantify the privacy of the mecha-
nismMi in (5) in terms of the estimation error covariance
of the state xi. For simplicity, we assume i 6= 1, and this
estimation is performed by Subsystem 1, which is directly
coupled with Subsystem i and receives limited measure-
ments from it. Then, we use this quantification to compare
and rank different privacy mechanisms.
We use a batch estimation scheme in which the esti-
mate is computed based on the collective measurements
obtained for k = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1, with T > 0 . Let y˜i =
[y˜Ti (0), · · · , y˜Ti (T − 1)]T, and let xi, vi, r˜i be similar time-
aggregated vectors of xi(k), vi(k), r˜i(k), respectively. Then,
using (5), we have
y˜i = (IT ⊗ SiCi︸ ︷︷ ︸
, Hi
)xi + (IT ⊗ Si)vi + r˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
, ri
, (27)
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where ri ∼ N (0,Σri) with Σri = IT ⊗ (SiΣviSTi + Σr˜i).
Note that Subsystem 1 that receives measurements (27)
from Subsystem i knows {Hi,Σri} (c.f. Assumption 2).
However, it is oblivious to the statistics of the confidential
stochastic signal xi. Therefore, it computes an estimate
of xi assuming that xi is a deterministic but unknown
quantity. Further, this estimate is computed by Subsys-
tem 1 using the measurements received only from Sub-
system i, and it does not use its local measurements or
the measurements received from other subsystems for this
purpose. The reason is twofold. First, although the local
measurements yL of Subsystem 1 depend on xi due to the
interconnected nature of the system (see (8)), they can-
not be used due to the presence of the unknown attack
on Subsystem 1 given by Fa˜a˜ = Faa, where Fa = F (I)
is known and a is unknown. If we try to eliminate these
unknown attacks by pre-multiplying (8) with a matrix M ′,
where (M ′)T is the basis of Null(Fa), this operation also
eliminates x (and xi), since Null(Fa) ⊆ Null(Fx). Second,
the measurements received from other subsystems cannot
be used since Subsystem 1 does not have the knowledge of
the dynamics or attacks on these other subsystems.2
According to (27), y˜i ∼ N (Hixi,Σri), and the Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML) estimate of xi based on y˜i is com-
puted by maximizing the log-likelihood function of y˜i, and
is given by:
xˆi= arg max
z
− 1
2
(y˜i −Hiz)TΣ−1ri (y˜i −Hiz)
(a)
= H˜+i H
T
i Σ
−1
ri y˜i + (I − H˜+i H˜i)di, where
H˜i , HTi Σ−1ri Hi ≥ 0,
(28)
di is any real vector of appropriate dimension, and equal-
ity (a) follows from Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. If H˜i
(or equivalently Hi) is not full column rank, then the es-
timate can lie anywhere in Null(H˜i) = Null(Hi) (shifted
by H˜+i H
T
i Σ
−1
ri y˜i). Thus, the component of xi that lies in
Null(Hi) cannot be estimated and only the component of
xi that lies in Im(H˜i) = Im(H
T
i ) can be estimated. Let
Pi , H˜+i H˜i denote the projection operator on Im(H˜i).
The estimation error in this subspace is given by:
ei = Pixi − Pixˆi = H˜+i H˜ixi − H˜+i HTi Σ−1ri y˜i
= −H˜+i HTi Σ−1ri ri, (29)
and the estimation error covariance is given by:
Σei = E[H˜
+
i H
T
i Σ
−1
ri rir
T
i Σ
−1
ri HiH˜
+
i ]
= H˜+i H
T
i Σ
−1
ri Hi︸ ︷︷ ︸
H˜i
H˜+i = H˜
+
i . (30)
Note that since the model in (27) is linear with Gaussian
noise, Pixˆi is the minimum-variance unbiased (MVU) es-
timate of xi projected on Im(H
T
i ). Thus, the covariance
2Due to these reasons, the estimation capability of any Subsystem
j ∈ S−i trying to infer xi will be the same.
Σei captures the fundamental limit on how accurately Pixi
can be estimated and, therefore, it is a suitable metric to
quantify privacy.
The privacy level of mechanism Mi in (5) is charac-
terized by two quantities: (i) rank(Si), and (ii) Σei . Intu-
itively, if rank(Si) is small, then Subsystem i shares fewer
measurements and, as a result, the component of xi that
cannot be estimated ((I − H˜+i H˜i)xi) becomes large. Fur-
ther, if Σei is large (in a positive semi-definite sense), this
implies that the estimation accuracy of the component of
xi that can be estimated (H˜
+
i H˜ixi) is worse. Thus, a lower
value of rank(Si) and a larger value of Σei implies a larger
level of privacy. Based on this discussion, we next define
an ordering between two privacy mechanisms.
Consider two privacy mechanismsM(1)i andM(2)i , and
let y˜
(k)
i , xˆ
(k)
i , k = 1, 2 denote the limited measurements and
estimates corresponding to the two mechanisms, respec-
tively. Further, let S
(k)
i , H
(k)
i , H˜
(k)
i ,P(k)i ,Σ(k)ei , k = 1, 2 de-
note the quantities defined above corresponding to M(1)i
and M(2)i .
Definition 1. (Privacy ordering) Mechanism M(2)i is
more private than M(1)i , denoted by M(2)i ≥M(1)i , if
(i) Im
(
(S
(2)
i )
T
)
⊆ Im
(
(S
(1)
i )
T
)
and,
(ii) Σ(2)ei ≥ P(2)i Σ(1)ei P(2)i . 
(31)
The first condition implies that y˜
(2)
i is a limited version
of y˜
(1)
i and is required for the ordering to be well defined.
Under this condition, it is easy to see that Im(H
(2)
i ) =
Im(P(2)i ) ⊆ Im(H(1)i ) = Im(P(1)i ). Thus, the estimated
component P(2)i xˆ(2)i lies in a subspace that is contained in
the subspace of the estimated component P(1)i xˆ(1)i . For a
fair comparison between the two mechanisms, we consider
the projection of P(1)i xˆ(1)i on Im(P(2)i ), given by
P(2)i P(1)i xˆ(1)i = P(2)i xˆ(1)i . Then, we compare its estimation
error (given by P(2)i Σ(1)ei P(2)i ) with the estimation error of
P(2)i xˆ(2)i (given by Σ(2)ei ) to obtain the second condition in
(31). Next, we present an example to illustrate Definition
1.
Example 2. Let xi ∈ R2, Ci = I2, T = 1, and consider
two privacy mechanisms given by:
M(1)i : y˜(1)i = (xi + vi) + r˜(1)i ,
M(2)i : y˜(2)i =
[
1 0
]
(xi + vi) + r˜
(2)
i ,
with Σvi = Σ
(1)
r˜i
= I2 and Σ
(2)
r˜i
= α ≥ 0. Mechanism
M(1)i shares both components of the measurement vector yi
(S
(1)
i = I2) whereas M(2)i shares only the first component
(S
(2)
i = [1 0]), and both add some artificial noise. The
state estimates under the two mechanisms (using (28)) are
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given by
xˆ
(1)
i = y˜
(1)
i and xˆ
(2)
i =
[
1
0
]
y˜
(2)
i +
[
0 0
0 1
]
di.
Thus, under M(1)i both components of xi can be estimated
while under M(2)i , only the first component can be esti-
mated. Further, we have Σ
(1)
ei = 2I2,Σ
(2)
ei =
[
1+α 0
0 0
]
and
P(2)i = [ 1 00 0 ]. Thus, the estimation error covariance of
the first component of xi under M(1)i and M(2)i are 2 and
1 +α, respectively, and M(2)i is more private than M(1)i if
α ≥ 1.
On the other hand, if α < 1, then an ordering between
the mechanisms cannot be established. In this case, under
M(1)i , both the state components can be estimated but the
estimation error in first component is large. In contrast,
under M(2)i , only the first component can be estimated but
its estimation error is small. 
Next, we state a sufficient condition on the noise added
by two privacy mechanisms that guarantee the ordering of
the mechanisms. This condition implies that, if one pri-
vacy mechanism shares a subspace of the measurements
of the other mechanism and injects a sufficiently large
amount of noise, then it is more private.
Lemma 4.1. (Sufficient condition for privacy or-
dering) Consider two privacy mechanismsM(1)i andM(2)i
in (5) with parameters (S
(k)
i ,Σ
(k)
r˜i
), k = 1, 2 that satisfy
condition (i) of (31). Let P be a full row rank matrix that
satisfies S
(2)
i = PS
(1)
i . If
Σ
(2)
r˜i
≥ PΣ(1)r˜i PT, (32)
then M(2)i is more private than M(1)i .
Proof: From (27) and (28), we have
H˜
(k)
i = IT ⊗ (S(k)i Ci)T
[
S
(k)
i Σvi(S
(k)
i )
T + Σ
(k)
r˜i
]−1
S
(k)
i Ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Y (k)
.
Since (S
(1)
i , S
(2)
i ) satisfy (31) (i), there always exist a full
row rank matrix P satisfying S
(2)
i = PS
(1)
i . Next we have,
Y (2)=(S
(1)
i Ci)
TPT
[
PS
(1)
i Σvi(S
(1)
i )
TPT+Σ
(2)
r˜i
]−1
PS
(1)
i Ci
=(S
(1)
i Ci)
TPT
[
P (S
(1)
i Σvi(S
(1)
i )
T+Σ
(1)
r˜i
)PT+E
]−1
PS
(1)
i Ci
(a)
≤(S(1)i Ci)T
[
S
(1)
i Σvi(S
(1)
i )
T+Σ
(1)
r˜i
]−1
S
(1)
i Ci = Y
(1) (33)
where E , Σ(2)r˜i − PΣ
(1)
r˜i
PT and (a) follows from E ≥ 0
(using (32)) and Lemma A.3 in the Appendix. From (33),
it follows that
H˜
(2)
i ≤ H˜(1)i
(b)⇒ H˜(2)i ≥ H˜(2)i (H˜(1)i )+H˜(2)i
(c)⇒ (H˜(2)i )+H˜(2)i (H˜(2)i )+ ≥ (H˜(2)i )+H˜(2)i (H˜(1)i )+H˜(2)i (H˜(2)i )+
(d)
= Condition (ii) in (31),
where (b) follows from [40, Lemma 1], and (c), (d) follow
from facts that (H˜
(k)
i )
+ is symmetric and (H˜
(k)
i )
+H˜
(k)
i =
H˜
(k)
i (H˜
(k)
i )
+. Thus, both conditions in (31) are satisfied
and M(2)i ≥M(1)i .
We conclude this section by showing that the privacy
mechanism in (5) exhibits an intuitive post-processing prop-
erty. It implies that if we further limit the measurements
produced by a privacy mechanism, then this operation can-
not decrease the privacy of the measurements. This post-
processing property also holds in the differential privacy
framework [26].
Lemma 4.2. (Post-processing increases privacy) Con-
sider two privacy mechanismsM(1)i andM(2)i , whereM(2)i
further limits the measurements of M(1)i as:
M(1)i : y˜(1)i (k) = S(1)i yi(k) + r˜(1)i (k)
M(2)i : y˜(2)i (k) = Sy˜(1)i (k) + ni(k),
where S is full row rank and ni(k) ∼ N (0,Σni). Then,
M(2)i is more private than M(1)i .
Proof: It is easy to observe that S
(2)
i = SS
(1)
i and r˜
(2)
i (k) =
Sr˜
(1)
i (k) + ni(k). Thus,
Σ
(2)
r˜i
= SΣ
(1)
r˜i
ST + Σni ≥ SΣ(1)r˜i ST,
and the result follows from Lemma 4.1.
Remark 4. (Comparison with Differential Privacy
(DP)) Additive noise based privacy mechanisms have also
been proposed in the framework of DP. Specifically, the no-
tion of (, δ)-DP uses a zero-mean Gaussian noise [26].
Although the frameworks of DP and this paper use addi-
tive Gaussian noises, there are conceptual differences be-
tween the two. The DP framework distinguishes between
the cases when a single subsystem is present or absent in
the system, and tries to make the output statistically sim-
ilar in both the cases. It allows access to arbitrary side
information and does not involve any specific estimation
algorithm. In contrast, our privacy framework assumes no
side information and privacy guarantees are specific to the
considered estimation procedure. Moreover, besides adding
noise, our framework also allows for an additional means
to vary privacy by sending fewer measurements, which is
not feasible in the DP framework. 
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5. Detection performance vs privacy trade-off
In this section, we present a trade-off between the at-
tack detection performance and privacy of the subsystems.
As before, we focus on detection for Subsystem 1 and con-
sider two measurement sharing privacy mechanisms M(1)j
and M(2)j for all other subsystems j ∈ S−1. The trade-off
is between the detection performance of Subsystem 1 and
the privacy level of all other subsystems. We begin by char-
acterizing the relation between the detection parameters
corresponding to these two sets of privacy mechanisms.
Theorem 5.1. (Relation among the detection pa-
rameters of privacy mechanisms) Let M(2)j be more
private than M(1)j for all j ∈ S−1. Given any attack vec-
tor a, let q(k) and λ(k) = aTΛ(k)a denote the detection
parameters under the privacy mechanisms
{
M(k)j
}
j∈S−1
,
for k = 1, 2. Then, we have
(i) q(1) ≥ q(2) and,
(ii) λ(2)µmax ≥ λ(1) ≥ λ(2)µmin ≥ λ(2),
(34)
where µmax and µmin are the largest and smallest gener-
alized eigenvalues of (Λ(1),Λ(2)), respectively.
Proof: From (5), (9) and (10), for k = 1, 2, we have
H(k) = IT ⊗ diag
(
S
(k)
2 C2, · · · , S(k)N CN
)
= S
(k)
−1H,
Σ(k)vR = S
(k)
−1 ΣvR(S
(k)
−1 )
T + Σ
(k)
r˜−1 > 0 where,
S
(k)
−1 = IT ⊗ diag
(
S
(k)
2 , · · · , S(k)N
)
,
Σ
(k)
r˜−1 = IT ⊗ diag
(
Σ
(k)
r˜2
, · · · ,Σ(k)r˜N
)
≥ 0.
Since M(2)j ≥ M(1)j for all j ∈ S−1, the first condition in
(31) results in
Im
(
(S
(1)
−1)
T
)
⊇ Im
(
(S
(2)
−1)
T
)
⇒ Im
(
(H(1))T
)
⊇ Im
(
(H(2))T
)
.
From (11), we have H˜(k) = (H(k))T(Σ
(k)
vR )
−1H(k). Since
Null(H˜(k)) = Null(H(k)), from (14), it follows that
Im(M (1)) ⊇ Im(M (2)). Recalling from (24) that q(k) =
Rank((M (k))TFa), it follows that q
(1) ≥ q(2).
Since Im(M (1)) ⊇ Im(M (2)), we have M (2) = M (1)P
for some full column rank matrix P . Let Z , FTxM (1)P .
From (16), we have
Σ(2)vP = (M
(2))TΣvLM
(2) + (M (2))TFx(H˜
(2))+FTxM
(2),
= PTΣ(1)vP P + Z
T[(H˜(2))+ − (H˜(1))+]Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
,E
. (35)
Next, we show that E ≥ 0. . Using M (2) = M (1)P , and
using (14) for both {M (k), H˜(k)}, k = 1, 2, we have
ZT(H˜(1))+H˜(1) = ZT(H˜(2))+H˜(2). (36)
Thus, we get
E = ZT[(H˜(2))+ − (H˜(1))+H˜(1)(H˜(1))+H˜(1)(H˜(1))+]Z
=ZT[(H˜(2))+−(H˜(2))+H˜(2)(H˜(1))+(H˜(2))+H˜(2)]Z (37)
where the last inequality follows from (36) and the fact
that H˜(k)(H˜(k))+ = (H˜(k))+H˜(k). Next, we have,
H˜(k) =IT⊗diag
[
(S
(k)
2 C2)
T(S
(k)
2 Σv2(S
(k)
2 )
T+Σ
(k)
r˜2
)−1S(k)2 C2,
· · · , (S(k)N CN )T
(
S
(k)
N ΣvN (S
(k)
N )
T + Σ
(k)
r˜N
)−1
S
(k)
N CN
]
=ΠTdiag
[
IT⊗(S(k)2 C2)T(S(k)2 Σv2(S(k)2 )T+Σ(k)r˜2 )−1S
(k)
2 C2,
· · · , IT⊗(S(k)N CN )T
(
S
(k)
N ΣvN (S
(k)
N )
T+Σ
(k)
r˜N
)−1
S
(k)
N CN
]
Π
= ΠTdiag
[
H˜
(k)
2 , · · · , H˜(k)N
]
Π and, (38a)
(H˜(k))+ = ΠTdiag
[
(H˜
(k)
2 )
+, · · · , (H˜(k)N )+
]
Π, (38b)
where Π is a permutation matrix with Π−1 = ΠT. Substi-
tuting (38a) and (38b) in (37), we have
E = ZTΠTdiag
[
(H˜
(2)
2 )
+ − P(2)2 (H˜(1)2 )+P(2)2 , · · ·
(H˜
(2)
N )
+ − P(2)N (H˜(1)N )+P(2)N
]
ΠZ
(a)
≥ 0,
where (a) follows from the second condition in (31) for all
j ∈ S−1. Next, from (24), we have,
Λ(2) = FTaM
(2)(Σ(2)vP )
−1(M (2))TFa
(35)
= FTaM
(1) P (PTΣ(1)vP P + E)
−1PT︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Y
(M (1))TFa
(b)
≤ FTaM (1)(Σ(1)vP )−1(M (1))TFa = Λ(1),
⇒ λ(1) = aTΛ(1)a ≥ aTΛ(2)a = λ(2),
where (b) follows from Lemma A.3 in the Appendix, and
the facts that E ≥ 0 and P is full column rank. Finally,
the second condition in (34) follows from Lemma A.4 in
the Appendix, and the proof is complete.
Theorem 5.1 shows that when the subsystems j ∈ S−1
share measurements with Subsystem 1 using more pri-
vate mechanisms, both the number of processed measure-
ments and the SNR reduce. This has implications on
the detection performance of Subsystem 1, as explained
next. To compare the performance corresponding to the
two sets of privacy mechanisms, we select the same false
alarm probability PF for both the cases and compare the
detection probability. Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 3.4 im-
ply that PD(q
(2), λ(2), PF ) can be greater or smaller than
PD(q
(1), λ(1), PF ) depending on the actual values of the
detection parameters. In fact, ignoring the dependency on
PF since it is same for both cases, we have
PD(q
(2), λ(2))− PD(q(1), λ(1)) =
PD(q
(2), λ(2))−PD(q(2), λ(1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+PD(q
(2), λ(1))−PD(q(1), λ(1)).︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
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Intuitively, if the decrease in PD due to the decrease in the
SNR3 (λ(1) → λ(2)) is larger than the increase in PD due to
the decrease in the number of measurements (q(1) → q(2)),
then the the detection performance decreases, and vice-
versa. The next result formalizes this intuition.
Theorem 5.2. (Condition for trade-off) Consider the
setup in Theorem 5.1, and let the detection probability be
given in (26). Then, for a given PF , a security-privacy
trade-off exists if and only if
PD(q
(2), λ(2), PF ) ≤ PD(q(1), λ(1), PF ).
The above result presents an analytical condition for
the trade-off. When this condition is violated, a counter
trade-off exists. This is an interesting and counter-intuitive
trade-off between the detection performance and privacy/
information sharing, and it implies that, in certain cases,
sharing less information can lead to a better detection per-
formance. This phenomenon occurs because the GLRT for
the considered hypothesis testing problem is a sub-optimal
test, as discussed before.
5.1. Privacy using only noise
In this subsection, we analyze the special case when the
subspace of the shared measurements is fixed, and the pri-
vacy level can be varied by changing only the noise level.
We begin by comparing the detection performance corre-
sponding to two privacy mechanisms that share the same
subspace of measurements.
Corollary 5.3. (Strict security-privacy trade-off )
Consider two privacy mechanisms M(2)j ≥M(1)j such that
Im
(
(S
(2)
j )
T
)
= Im
(
(S
(1)
j )
T
)
for j ∈ S−1. Let (q(k), λ(k))
denote the detection parameters of Subsystem 1 under the
privacy mechanisms
{
M(k)j
}
j∈S−1
, for k = 1, 2. Then,
for any given PF , we have
PD(q
(2), λ(2), PF ) ≤ PD(q(1), λ(1), PF ).
Proof: Since the mechanisms share the same subspace of
measurements, from the proof of Theorem 5.1, we have
Im
(
(S
(1)
−1)
T
)
=Im
(
(S
(2)
−1)
T
)
⇒ Im
(
(H(1))T
)
=Im
(
(H(2))T
)
⇒ Im
(
M (1)
)
=Im
(
M (2)
)
⇒ q(1) = q(2).
The fact that λ(1) ≥ λ(2) follows from Theorem 5.1, and
the result then follows from Lemma 3.4.
The above result implies that there is strict trade-off
between privacy and detection performance when the sub-
space of the shared measurements is fixed and the privacy
3Note that the SNR depends upon the attack vector a (via (24)),
which we do not know a-priori. Thus, depending on the actual attack
value, the SNR can take any positive value.
level is varied by changing the noise level. In this case,
more private mechanisms result in a poorer detection per-
formance, and vice-versa.
Corollary 5.3 qualitatively captures the security-privacy
trade-off. Next, we present a quantitative analysis that de-
termines the best possible detection performance subject
to a given privacy level. Note that since the subspace of
the shared measurements is fixed, the detection parameter
q is also fixed, as well as PF and the attack a. Thus, ac-
cording to Lemma 3.4, the detection performance can be
improved by increasing λ = aTΛa. Intuitively, λ is large
(irrespective of a) if Λ is large, or when Λ+ is small (in a
positive-semidefinite sense).4 Further, the privacy level is
quantified by the error covariance in (30). Based on this,
we formulate the following optimization problem:5
min
Σr˜2 ≥ 0, · · · ,Σr˜N ≥ 0
Tr(Λ+) (39)
s.t. Tr(Σei) ≥ ′i, i = 2, · · · , N,
where ′i > 0 is the minimum desired privacy level of Sub-
system i. The design variables of the above optimization
problem are the positive semi-definite noise covariance ma-
trices Σr˜2 , · · · ,Σr˜N . Next, we show that under some mild
assumptions, (39) is a semidefinite optimization problem.
Lemma 5.4. Assume that F (I) in (6) and Ci for i =
1, · · · , N are full row rank. Let D1 =
∑T
i=1D1,i, where
the matrices D1,i ∈ Rn1×n1 , i = 1, · · · , T are the block
diagonal elements of (MTFa)
+MTFa. Further, let
K1 = B1(S−1C−1)+, L1 = KT1 D1K1,
l1 = Tr
[
(MTFa)
+MTΣvLM((M
TFa)
+)T
]
+ Tr
[
(MTFa)
+MTFa
[
IT ⊗
(
K1S−1Σv−1S
T
−1K
T
1
)]]
,
gi = Tr
[
H+i [IT ⊗ (SiΣviSTi )](H+i )T
]
,
Gi = ((SiCi)
+)T(SiCi)
+.
Then, Tr(Λ+) = l1 + Tr(L1Σr˜−1) and Tr(Σei) = gi +
T Tr(GiΣr˜i), where Σr˜−1 = diag(Σr˜2 , · · · ,Σr˜N ).
Proof: From (30), Σei = H˜
+
i , where H˜i = H
T
i Σ
−1
ri Hi and
Hi = IT ⊗ SiCi. Since, Si and Ci are assumed to be full
row rank, Hi is full row rank. Next, we have
H˜+i
(a)
= H+i Σri(H
+
i )
T
(27)
= H+i [IT ⊗ (SiΣviSTi )](H+i )T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ui
+H+i [IT ⊗ Σr˜i ](H+i )T
(27)
= Ui + IT ⊗ [(SiCi)+Σr˜i((SiCi)+)T]
⇒ Tr(H˜+i ) = gi + T Tr(GiΣr˜i),
4Minimization of Λ+ allows us to formulate a semidefinite opti-
mization problem, as we show later.
5This problem corresponds to Subsystem 1. A similar problem
can be formulated for the whole system whose cost is the sum of the
costs of the individual subsystems.
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where (a) follows from Lemma A.5 in the Appendix.
Next, from (24), Λ = MT1 Σ
−1
vPM1 where M1 = M
TFa.
Since MT and Fa = F (I) are assumed to be full row rank,
M1 is full row rank. Next, we have
Λ+
(b)
= M+1 ΣvP (M
+
1 )
T
(16),(7),(b)
= M+1 M
TΣvLM(M
+
1 )
T
+M+1 M1(IT ⊗B1)H+ΣvR(H+)T(IT ⊗BT1 )MT1 (M+1 )T
(10)
= M+1 M
TΣvLM(M
+
1 )
T
+M+1 M1
[
IT ⊗
(
K1S−1Σv−1S
T
−1K
T
1
)]
M+1 M1
+M+1 M1
[
IT ⊗
(
K1Σr˜−1K
T
1
)]
M+1 M1,
⇒Tr(Λ+) (c)= l1 + Tr(D1K1Σr˜−1KT1 ) = l1 + Tr(L1Σr˜−1).
where (b) follows from Lemma A.5 in the Appendix, and
(c) follows from the definition of D1 and trivial algebraic
manipulation.
Using the above theorem, (39) is equivalent to the fol-
lowing semidefinite optimization problem [41]
min
Σr˜2 ≥ 0, · · · ,Σr˜N ≥ 0
Tr(L1Σr˜−1) + l1 (40)
s.t. Tr(GiΣr˜i) ≥
′i − gi
T
:= i ≥ 0,
for i = 2, 3, · · · , N , which can be solved using standard
semidefinite optimization algorithms [41]. This analysis
allows us to design optimal noisy privacy mechanisms.
6. Simulation Example
We consider a power network model of the IEEE 39-bus
test case [42] consisting of 10 generators interconnected
by transmission lines whose resistances are assumed to be
negligible. Each generator is modeled according to the
following second-order swing equation [43]:
Miθ¨i +Diθ˙i = Pi −
n∑
k=1
EiEk
Xik
sin(θi − θk), (41)
where θi,Mi, Di, Ei and Pi denote the rotor angle, mo-
ment of inertia, damping coefficient, internal voltage and
mechanical power input of the ith generator, respectively.
Further, Xij denotes the reactance of the transmission line
connecting generators i and j (Xij =∞ if they are not con-
nected). We linearize (41) around an equilibrium point to
obtain the following collective small-signal model:[
dθ˙
dθ¨
]
=
[
0 I
−M−1L −M−1D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A˜c
[
dθ
dθ˙
]
︸︷︷ ︸
x˜(t)
+
[
0
M−1B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B˜ac
a˜(t), (42)
where dθ denotes a small deviation of θ =
[
θ1 θ2 · · · θ10
]T
from the equilibrium value, M = diag(M1,M2, · · · ,M10),
D = diag(D1, D2, · · · , D10), and L is a symmetric Lapla-
cian matrix given by
Lij =

−EiEjXij cos(θi − θj) for i 6= j,
−
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
Lij for i = j. (43)
Further, a˜ models small malicious alterations (attacks)
in the mechanical power input of the generators that need
to be detected. We assume that generators {1, 4, 8} are
under attack. Thus, B =
[
e1, e4, e8
]
, where ej denotes
the jth canonical vector. We assume that the power net-
work is divided into 3 subsystems consisting of generators
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6, 7} and {8, 9, 10}. Accordingly, we per-
mute the state vector in (42) using a permutation matrix
Π such that Πx˜ = x = [xT1 , x
T
2 , x
T
3 ]
T, where xi consists of
rotor angles and velocities of all generators in Subsystem
i. The transformed system is given by x˙ = Acx+B
a
c a˜(t),
where Ac = ΠA˜cΠ
−1 and Bac = ΠB˜
a
c . Next, we sample
this continuous time system with sampling time Ts = 0.1
to obtain a discrete-time system x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Baa˜(k)
with A = eAcTs and Ba =
(
Ts∫
t=0
eAcτdτ
)
Bac . We assume
that the discrete-time process dynamics are affected by
process noise according to (1). The rotor angle and the
angular velocity of all generators are measured using Pha-
sor Measurement Units (PMUs) according to the noisy
model (2). The time horizon is T = 3.
The generator voltage and angle values are obtained
from [42]. We fix the damping coefficient for each gener-
ator as 10, and the moment of inertia values are chosen
as M = [70, 10, 40, 30, 70, 30, 90, 80, 40, 50]. The reactance
matrix X is generated randomly, where each entry of X
is distributed independently according to N (0, 0.01). We
focus on the attack detection for Subsystem 1, where Sub-
systems 2 and 3 use privacy mechanisms to share their
measurements with Subsystem 1. The parameters of Sub-
system 1 can be extracted from A,Ba as A =
[
A1 B1
∗
]
and Ba = blockdiag(Ba1 , ∗, ∗). The noise covariances are
Σw1 = 0.5I6 and Σv1 = Σv3 = I4 and Σv2 = 0.5I6.
We consider the following three cases of privacy mech-
anisms for Subsystems 2 and 3:
• M(0) = {M(0)2 ,M(0)3 }: Subsystems 2 and 3 do not
use any privacy mechanisms and share actual mea-
surements, i.e., S2 = I8, S3 = I6,Σr˜2 = 0, and
Σr˜3 = 0.
• M(1): Subsystem 2 does not use any privacy mech-
anism (S2 = I8,Σr˜2 = 0) while Subsystem 3 shares
noisy measurements of generators {8, 9}
(S3 = [e1, e2, e3, e4]
T
, Σr˜3 = I4).
• M(2): Subsystems 2 and 3 share noisy measurements
of generators {4, 5, 6} and {8, 9}, respectively. (S2 =
12
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Comparison between detection performance of case 0 with:
(a) case 1, and (b) case 2. In the blue region, case 0 performs better
than case0/case 1, and vice versa in red region. Since λ(0) ≥ λ(k)
for k = 1, 2 (c.f. Lemma 5.1), the white region is inadmissible.
[e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, e6]
T
, S3 = [e1, e2, e3, e4]
T
,Σr˜2 =
I6, and Σr˜3 = I4).
Using Lemma 4.1, it can be easily verified that the
following privacy ordering holds: M(2) > M(1) > M(0).
Recall that the detection performance is completely char-
acterized by PF and the detection parameters (q, λ). We
choose PF = 0.05 for all the cases. Let (q
(k), λ(k)), k =
0, 1, 2 denote the detection parameters for the above three
cases. Recall that the parameter q depends only the sys-
tem parameters, whereas the parameter λ depends on the
system parameters as well as the attack values. For the
above cases, we have q(0) = 18, q(1) = 12 and q(3) = 6. Re-
calling (24), the value of λ(k) = aTΛ(k)a can lie anywhere
between [0,∞) depending on the attack value a. Thus, for
simplicity, we present the results in this section in terms
of λ(k).
We aim to compare the detection performance of case 0
with cases 1 and 2, respectively. We are interested in iden-
tifying the ranges of the detection parameters for which
one case performs better than the other. As mentioned
previously, the parameters q(k) are fixed for the three cases,
so we compare the performance for different values of the
parameter λ(k). Fig. 4 presents the performance compari-
son of case 0 with case 1 (Fig. 4(a)) and case 2 (Fig. 4(a)).
Any point (x, y) in the colored regions are achievable by an
attack, i.e., there exists an attack a such that aTΛ(k)a = x
and aTΛ(0)a = y, whereas the white region is inadmissi-
ble (see (34)). The blue region corresponds to the pairs
(λ(k), λ(0)) for which case 0 performs better than case k,
i.e., PD(q
(0), λ(0), PF ) ≥ PD(q(k), λ(k), PF ) for k = 1, 2. In
the red region, case k performs better that case 0, k = 1, 2.
We observe that case 0 performs better than case k
if λ
(0)
λ(k)
is large, and vice versa. This shows that if the
attack vector a is such that λ
(0)
λ(k)
is small, then the detec-
tion performance corresponding to a more private mech-
anism (M(k) > M(0)) is better. This implies that there
is non-strict trade-off between privacy and detection per-
formance. This counter-intuitive result is due to the sub-
optimality of the GLRT used to perform detection, as ex-
plained before (c.f. discussion above Remark 3). Further,
we observe that the red region of Fig. 4(b) is larger than
(and contains) the red region of Fig. 4(b). This is because
M(2) is more private than M(1).
Next, we consider the case where Subsystems 2 and 3
implement their privacy mechanisms by only adding artifi-
cial noise in (5). Thus, S2 = I8, S3 = I6, and the artificial
noise covariances are given by Σr˜2 = σ
2I8 and Σr˜3 = σ
2I6.
The attack on Subsystem 1 (that is, on generator 1) is
a˜(k) = 2500 for k = 0, 1, 2. Clearly, as the noise level σ in-
creases, the privacy level also increases. Fig. 5 shows the
detection performance of Subsystem 1 for varying noise
level σ. We observe that the detection performance is a
decreasing function of the noise level (c.f. Corollary 5.3),
implying a strict trade-off between detection performance
and privacy in this case. Finally, we illustrate this strict
trade-off by also explicitly solving the optimization prob-
lem (40) and computing the optimal noise covariance ma-
trices. We fix the same desired privacy level for Subsys-
tems 2 and 3: 1 = 2 = . Fig. 6 shows that the optimal
cost in (40) increases with , indicating that the detection
performance decreases as privacy level increases.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
Figure 5: Detection performance for varying level of noise parameter
σ.
0 2 4 6 8 10
380
400
420
440
Figure 6: Optimal cost of (40) as a function of the privacy level .
7. Conclusion
We study an attack detection problem in interconnected
dynamical systems where each subsystem is tasked with
detection of local attacks without any knowledge of the
dynamics of other subsystems and their interconnection
signals. The subsystems share measurements among them-
selves to aid attack detection, but they also limit the amount
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and quality of the shared measurements due to privacy
concerns. We show that there exists a non-strict trade-off
between privacy and detection performance, and in some
cases, sharing less measurements can improve the detec-
tion performance. We reason that this counter-intuitive
result is due the suboptimality of the considered χ2 test.
Future work includes exploring if this counter-intuitive
trade-off exist for alternative detection schemes (for in-
stance, unknown-input observers) and for other types of
statistical tests. Also, recursive schemes to compute the
state estimates, eliminate interconnections and compute
the detection probability will be explored. Finally, pri-
vacy ordering of two mechanisms irrespective of their sub-
spaces of shared measurement will be defined using suit-
able weighing matrix for each subspace.
APPENDIX
Lemma A.1. The optimal solutions of the following weighted
least squares problem:
min
x
J(x) = (y −Hx)TΣ−1(y −Hx), (44)
with Σ > 0 are given by
x∗ = H˜+HTΣ−1y + (I − H˜+H˜)d, (45)
where H˜ = HTΣ−1H, and d is any real vector of appro-
priate dimension. Further, the optimal value of the cost
is
J(x∗) = yT(Σ−1 − Σ−1HH˜+HTΣ−1)y. (46)
Lemma A.2. Let
[
A B
BT D
]
be a positive definite matrix with
A > 0, D ≥ 0. Further, let M ≥ 0. Then,[
A B
BT D
]−1 ≥ [ (A+M)−1 0
0 0
]
,
Proof: Using the Schur complement, we have[
A B
BT D
]−1
=
[
I −A−1B
0 I
] [
A−1 0
0 (D−BTA−1B)−1
] [
I 0
−BTA−1 I
]
,
where the Schur complement D −BTA−1B > 0. Further,[
(A+M)−1 0
0 0
]
=
[
I −A−1B
0 I
] [
(A+M)−1 0
0 0
] [
I 0
−BTA−1 I
]
Since A+M ≥ A, A−1 ≥ (A+M)−1. Thus,[
A−1−(A+M)−1 0
0 (D−BTA−1B)−1
]
≥ 0,
and the result follows.
Lemma A.3. Let Σ > 0 ∈ Rn×n and Σa ≥ 0 ∈ Rm×m,
with m ≤ n, and let S ∈ Rn×m be full (column) rank.
Then,
Σ−1 ≥ S(STΣS + Σa)−1ST. (47)
Proof: Since S is full column rank, STΣS > 0, STΣS+Σa
is invertible and S+S = Im = S
T(ST)+. Thus, In =[
ST(ST)+ 0
0 In−m
]
. LetN ∈ Rn×(n−m) denote a matrix whose
columns are the basis of Null(ST). Then, [ ST(ST)+ 0 ] =
ST [ (ST)+ N ] , STR. Since, Im((ST)+) = Im(S) ⊥ Null(ST),
R is non-singular. Let T , [ 0 In−m ]R−1. Then, we have
In =
[
ST
T
]
R = R
[
ST
T
]
. Thus,
Σ−1 = ITn (InΣI
T
n )
−1In
= [ S TT ]RT
(
R
[
ST
T
]
Σ [ S TT ]RT
)−1
R
[
ST
T
]
= [ S TT ]
([
ST
T
]
Σ [ S TT ]
)−1 [
ST
T
]
= [ S TT ]
[
STΣS STΣTT
TΣS TΣTT
]−1 [
ST
T
]
, and
S(STΣS + Σa)
−1ST = [ S TT ]
[
(STΣS+Σa)
−1 0
0 0
]−1 [
ST
T
]
.
The result follows from Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.4. Let M1 ≥ M2 ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0 and let J(x) =
xTM1x. Then, the maximum and minimum values of J(x)
subject to xTM2x = λ are given by λµmax and λµmin re-
spectively, where µmax and µmin are the largest and small-
est generalized eigenvalues of (M1,M2), respectively.
Proof: Consider the following optimization problem
min /max
x
J(x) = xTM1x, subject to x
TM2x = λ.
The Lagrangian of this problem is given by l = xTM1x−
µ(xTM2x − λ), where µ ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier.
By differentiating l, the first order optimality condition
is given by (M1 − µM2)x = 0. Thus, µ is a generalized
eigenvalue of (M1,M2). Further, using M1x = µM2x, the
cost at the optimum is given by λµ and the maximum and
minimum values of the cost given in the lemma follow.
Lemma A.5. Let H˜ = HTΣ−1H where Σ > 0 and H has
a full row rank. Then, H˜+ = H+Σ(H+)T.
Proof: Let Σ = RRT be the Cholesky decomposition.
H˜+ = ((R−1H)TR−1H)+ = (R−1H)+((R−1H)+)T
(a)
= H+RRT(H+)T = H+Σ(H+)T,
where (a) follows since H is full row rank.
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